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Introduction 
 
State capture represents o form of corruption. Introduced by Hellman and Kaufmann 
(2001), the state capture concept represents the process through which “firms make 
private payments to public officials to influence the choice and design of laws, rules and 
regulations”1. In itself, the concept, as well as its multiple expressing forms, was tackled 
by several specialists on the corruption analysis issue. Bardhan and Mookherjee (2000) 
explore the effects of federalism on capture, and find that electoral decentralization 
makes this problem worse. “In a sense, interest groups are more cohesive at the local 
level, hence they are better positioned to finance politicians’ favours or “buy” laws”2. 
Hellman, Jones and Kaufamnn (2000) make a complex analysis of the way in which 
these are capable of creating their own rules of the game in relation with the state’s 
institutions. The authors empirically investigate the dynamics of the capture economy on 
the basis of new firm-level data from the 1999 Business Environment and Enterprise 
Performance Survey (BEEPS), which permits the unbundling of corruption into 
meaningful and measurable components. The state capture concept is included in the 
World Bank’s studies in a broader environment of the state’s actions of corruption. The 
state corruption comprises the designing of laws, rules and decrees by a large number of 
state institutions, including the executive, the ministers and the state agencies, the 
legislative an the judiciary. At the same time, state corruption has a more narrow 
definition that exclusively focuses upon the illicit, illegal, and non-transparent forms of 
influence. Who can corrupt the state? Often “the corrupters” are persons, groups or 
private sector companies that are looking for tax exemptions or other advantages from the 
state. Nevertheless, any of the stakeholders, who have access to the public officials and to 
the capacity to ensure private benefits for these officials in order to obtain advantages in 
the governance process, can be a potential corrupter. In truth, public officials themselves 
can corrupt the state if they abuse their authority in order to give deform the institutions 
and laws, mainly to follow their own financial interests, in spite of disadvantage the 
public interest, though the identification and the exact measurement of some interest 
conflicts are almost impossible to accomplish in the context of transition. The influence 
of the private interests upon the state’s decisions is a specific feature of all the political 
systems. What differentiates the state corruption as a form of corruption from the 
conventional forms of the political influence, like lobbying, are the mechanisms through 
which the private interests interact with the state. The state corruption takes place by 
                                                 
1 Hellman, J., Kaufmann, D., (2001), “Confronting the Challenge of State Capture in Transition Countries”, 
Finance and Development, vol. 38, no. 3, September, p.1.  
2 Bardhan, P., Mookherjee, D., (2000), “Capture and governance at local and national level”, American 
Economic Review, 90(2), pp. 135-9, taken from Rose-Ackerman (2006), pp.152.  
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illicitly ensuring private gains to the public officials through informal, non-transparent 
and obviously preferential channels of access.  
It also takes place in the absence of some clear borders between the political interests and 
the business interests of the state officials, which represented a prominent feature of 
many countries in transition. In all its forms, the state corruption tends to undermine or 
even substitute the legitimate a transparent channels of political influence and of 
interests’ intermediation, reducing the access of groups and competent interests to the 
state officials. The forms of state corruption differentiated after the corrupters’ type (e.g. 
private firms, politicians, ethnic groups, and army) and the different state institutions   
involved (e.g. the executive, legislative and judiciary branch, or other authorised 
institutions) will certainly have their own dynamics and consequences. Thus, the state 
corruption in itself can present a broad area of different relations. The reduction of state 
corruption involves the state removing the private sector’s influence in policy-making, 
rules and laws formulations. In truth, such an influence can be an important factor that 
accelerates both the political reform and the economic one. This problem will not be 
solved neither through the authentication of private payments for the public officials. The 
reduction of state corruption rather involves the change of the private sector’s influence 
from illicit, non-transparent and obviously preferential of the access channels into 
competitive forms of interests’ intermediation. Also, it involves the development of 
clearer border between the political roles and the business roles of the state officials in 
order to prevent the conflicts of interest.  
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Chapter I 
State capture, influence and lobbying 
 
“They contrast state capture (firms shaping and affecting formulation of the rules of the 
game through private payments to public officials and politicians) with influence (doing 
the same without recourse to payments) and with administrative corruption (“petty” form 
of bribery in connection with the implementation of laws, rules, and regulation)”3. 
According to the mentioned authors, the state capture, the influence and the 
administrative corruption have abstract causes and consequences. Significant aspects are 
emphasised for the large companied that benefit from close official connections and 
inherit the previous influence, which became traditional influence. For the new 
companies that plan to compete with the traditional ones, state capture becomes a 
strategic choice, as an innovation substitute to compensate the weaknesses of the juridical 
and regulation framework. The intervention of the latter happens when the public goods 
are underprovided and, by using the “pirate” competition they will directly acquire 
directly from the state forms such private benefits like the property rights, removal of 
obstacles aiming at public performance, etc.  
The empirical researches enclosed in the mentioned paper have showed that the 
administrative corruption, unlike the state capture or the influence, is not associated with 
specific benefits for the firms4. Kaufmann, Hellman, Jones and Schankerman (2000) 
tackle the link between the corporate governance and the business environment, 
corroborating the above mentioned issue with that of measuring the government 
performance. A topic insufficiently explained in the authors’ view, until the moment 
analysed by them, is materialised through a study regarding the assessment of governance 
and corruption as viewed by the firms. “Particular attention is paid to state capture by 
parts of the corporate sector (i.e. the propensity of firms to shape the underlying “rules of 
the game” including “purchase” of legislation and court decisions”5. The sociologic 
growth “also provides measures of other dimensions of “grand corruption”, such as that 
related to public procurement”6.  
Without confusing lobbying with the influence introduced by Hellman, Jones and 
Kaufmann (2000), Begovic (2005) make a comparative analysis of the corruption and 
lobby effects regarding the social welfare seen as an alternative method of state capture. 
Following Appelbaum and Katza (1987) as well as Lambsdorff (2002), Begovic (2005) 
refer to a relation between transfers and the total costs of the state capture (rent-seeking) 
can be specified as: 
 
xcz )1( −=      (1) 
 
                                                 
3 Hellman, J., James, G., Kaufmann, D., (2000), “Seize the State, Seize the Day, State Capture and 
Influence in Transition Economies”, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, no. 2444, pp. 1-2.  
4 Idem, pp. 2.  
5 Kaufmann, D., Hellman, J.S., Jones, G., Schankerman, M.A., (2000), “Measuring Governance, 
Corruption, and State Capture: How Firms and Bureaucrats Shape the Business Environment in Transition 
Economies”, World Bank Policy Research Paper no. 2312, pp.1.  
6 Idem 6.  
 3
Where x stands for total costs of state capture by an interested party, z – for the total 
transfer of welfare to the legislation and c is a parameter which stands for transaction 
costs, that is, the costs of the transfer. Parameter c takes the values: 
 
    10 ≤≤ c                          (2) 
 
So that in case c=0 there is pure corruption, i.e. a transfer without any costs, and in case 
c=1 there is pure lobbying without any transfer of wealth/welfare from an interest group 
to a legislative7.  
For the economies in transition, like the one of Romania, the state capture phenomenon 
is more spread due to the high level of concentration of the economy, its structure as well 
as the low mobility of the labour force, both horizontally and vertically. (Sonin (2009)). 
 
I.1 State Capture Index  
 
The index has been used for the first time by Hellman, Jones, and Kaufmann (2000). The 
index has as base the empirical investigation the dynamics of the capture economy on the 
basis of new firm-level data from the 1999 Business Environment and Enterprise 
Performance Survey (BEEPS), as part of World Business Environment Survey. The 
results of this survey are presented in Hellman, Jones, Kaufmann, and Schankerman 
(2000).  
To construct an index of the capture economy, firm were asked to asses the extent 
to which the following six types of activities have had a direct impact on their business: 
? the sale of Parliamentary votes on laws to private interests; 
? the sale of Presidential decrees to private interests; 
? Central Bank mishandling of funds; 
? the sale of court decisions in criminal cases; 
? the sale of court decisions in commercial cases; 
? illicit contributions paid by private interests to political parties and 
election campaigns. 
From the analysis of the data follows that states which do not adopt measures 
such as privatization, reducing the state participation in economy, liberalization of the 
market, thus with underdeveloped private sector have few chances to know the 
phenomenon of state capture.     
 
                                                 
7 Begovic, B., (2005), “Corruption, Lobbying and State Capture”, CLDS Working Paper #0106, March, pp. 
11.  
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Chapter II  
State capture, administrative corruption and the anticorruption strategies8
 
The relation between state capture and administrative corruption, in better words, its 
intensity, represents the basis of the conception for many anticorruption strategies. 
Defined by Hellman and Kaufmann (2001)9, with reverberations especially in transition 
economies, state capture refers to the actions of individuals, groups, or firms both in the 
public and private sectors to influence making of laws, regulations, decrees, and other 
government policies to their own advantage as a result of the illicit and non-transparent 
provision of private benefits to public officials.  
Types of institutions subject to capture: 
? the legislature,  
? the executive,  
? the judiciary, or  
? regulatory agencies. 
Types of actors engaged in the capturing: 
? private firms,  
? political leaders, or  
? narrow interest groups.  
Yet all forms of state capture are directed toward extracting rents from the state for a 
narrow range of individuals, firms, or sectors through distorting the basic legal and 
regulatory framework with potentially enormous losses for the society at large. They 
thrive where economic power is highly concentrated, countervailing social interests are 
weak, and the formal channels of political influence and interest intermediation are 
underdeveloped. 
On the other hand, administrative corruption refers to the intentional imposition of 
distortions in the prescribed implementation of existing laws, rules, and regulations to 
provide advantages to either state or non-state actors as a result of the illicit and non-
transparent provision of private gains to public officials. Examples of administrative 
corruption: bribes to a seemingly endless stream of official inspectors to overlook minor 
(or possibly major) infractions of existing regulations; “grease payments” as bribes to 
gain licenses, to smooth customs procedures, to win public procurement contracts, or to 
be given priority in the provision of a variety of other government services; state officials 
can simply misdirect public funds under their control for their own or their family’s direct 
financial benefit. At the root of this form of corruption is discretion on the part of public 
officials to grant selective exemptions, to prioritize the delivery of public services, or to 
discriminate in the application of rules and regulations. (Figure I.1) 
                                                 
8 The chapter follows the ideas from Matei, L., Matei, A., (2009), “Corruption in the Public Organizations 
– Towards a Model of Cost-Benefit Analysis for the Anticorruption Strategies”, available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1405209 
9 Hellman, J., Kaufmann, D., (2001), “Confronting the challenge of state capture in transition economies”, 
Finance and Development, Vol. 38, No. 3, Sept., IMF, pp. 5-8. 
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Figure I.1 Multi -pronged Strategy: Addressing State Capture and Administrative  
                 Corruption10
 
 
 
To be effective, a multi-pronged approach requires some guidelines for the selection and 
sequencing of reform priorities tailored to the particular contours of the corruption 
problem in each country.  
The typology can be divided into four spheres determined by the relative levels of state 
capture and administrative corruption: 
• Countries within the medium-medium category have been able to contain both types of 
corruption to more manageable levels, though serious challenges remain. 
• In the medium-high category are countries where the problem of administrative 
corruption remains the central problem, while the state has been less subject to capture 
by the private sector than other transition countries. 
• The high-medium category includes countries that have been able to contain the level of 
administrative corruption relative to other transition countries, but nevertheless have 
done so in a context of high state capture. 
• In the high-high category, a serious problem of administrative corruption—and hence, 
weak state capacity—is nested in a state highly subject to capture. 
 
 
                                                 
10 The World Bank, (2000), “Anticorruption in Transition. A Contribution to the Policy Debate”, chapter 4, 
p. 39, Washington D.C. 
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II.2 World Bank: Designing Effective Anticorruption Strategies11
 
The strategies are based on the studies and field analyses carried out even by the World 
Bank or prestigious authors for the topic on combating corruption. The actual strategy 
offers “a framework for self-assessment of corruption within each country rather than a 
device for providing a fixed reform blueprint for each country in the region”. At the same 
time, “a key argument embedded in the typology is that an anticorruption strategy should 
be designed not only in response to the level of either state capture or administrative 
corruption alone in a given country, but to the interaction of these forms of corruption as 
well”12.    
In the context of the above documentary sources, Figure I.2 presents a synthesis of the 
key focus, challenges and priorities for each typology of the relation state capture-
administrative corruption.  
 
 
 
 
 
11 The World Bank, (2000), “Anticorruption in Transition. A Contribution to the Policy Debate”, chapter 5, 
pp. 58-78, Washington D.C. 
12 Idem, p.59 
 
Figure I.2 Intensity of the relation state capture-administrative corruption and structure of anticorruption strategies 
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II.3 Anti- state capture strategies in South Eastern Europe  
 
Hellman (2002) analyses the specific situation of the countries in transition with regard to 
the size of the state capture phenomenon. By making every time the necessary links with 
the administrative corruption, the author mentions for those countries, Romania included, 
some “very serious issues”13: 
• the lack of  a stable system for public financing; 
• weak levels of collective action and of social organisation; 
This fact is the result of the post-communist heritage, of the discrediting of the collective 
interests and, therefore, the emergence of some interest groups.  
• The market is dominated by very large stakes, for which the rules of the game are 
altered. This situation is due to the fact that the transition concentrates important 
issues of redistribution of property, design of new laws, building new institutions as 
well as establishing the regulation framework.  
• The market for influence is virtually unregulated; 
This refers to the fact that the incipient stage of the financing policy-making, conflict of 
interest, freedom of information, lobby etc. 
• Increasing competition on the influence market determined by the emergence of new 
financial and industrial groups, as well as the introduction of some anti-competitive 
rules/ obstacles.  
• The reform process of the policies also becomes the attribute of state capture, which 
does not limit only to monopolising some channels of influence and it even occupies 
the field of public policy-making in relation to group or individual interests.  
• Strengthening the regulation and monitoring process of public financing. It can be 
said that there is a “market of the state capture” in which there is both a buyer and a 
seller of influence. In perspective, this “market” must be regulated through clear 
norms that can be successfully applied by the public authorities in the process of 
monitoring the borders between money and politics.  
With reference to the administrative corruption, Hellman (2002) focuses upon some 
mechanisms that proved to be useful for the fight against corruption. From these, the 
author describes14: 
• Point-of-service evaluation surveys (POSEs); 
• Deregulation monitoring surveys; 
• Scorecards; 
• Corruption impact assessments. 
 
II.3.1 The assessment of state capture/administrative corruption in South Eastern 
Europe 
For the states in the South Eastern Europe the studies for assessing the state capture 
phenomena are not that many. Correlating these with administrative corruption, for 
which the World Bank, Transparency International, etc. provide annual assessments, can 
lead to more real images of the corruption in South Eastern Europe, and not only. 
Kaufmann et al. (2000) emphasise the results of a broad research, for the transition 
                                                 
13 Hellman, J., (2002), op.cit., pp. 3-6.  
14 For details see Hellman (2002), Op.cit., pp. 8-10. 
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economies, of the perception inside the business environment of the state capture and 
administrative corruption phenomena. On the basis of a sample comprising 3000 
companies from 20 countries, the conclusions point out, for many of the South Eastern 
European states, alarming results. The forms of corruption15 are synthesised in Table II.1. 
 
 
Table II.1 Forms of corruption with an impact upon the business environment  
Type Forms of corruption 
State capture • Sale of Parliamentary votes on laws to 
private interests; 
• Sale of Presidential decrees to private 
interests; 
• Central Bank mishandling of funds; 
• Sale of court decisions in criminal 
cases; 
• Sale of court decisions in arbitration 
cases; 
• Contributions paid by private interests 
to political parties and election 
campaigns.  
Administrative corruption • Patronage, defined as public officials 
hiring their friends and relatives to 
official positions; 
• Bribes paid to public officials to avoid 
taxes and regulations. 
    
 
In the paper, there are also presented the level of the Parliament capture, presidential or 
Central Bank capture. For some states in South Eastern Europe some illustrative data16 
are presented below in order to provide a comparative basis regarding the state capture 
levels, and the ones of administrative corruption.  
                                                 
15 Idem 6, pp.21.  
16 The data are extracted from the synthesis and figures in Kaufmann et al. (2000), op.cit., pp. 21-24.   
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Figure II.1.a Legislative Capture for the South Eastern European states 
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Figure II.1.b Presidential Capture for the South Eastern European states 
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It can be observed that the percentages showing major or moderate obstacles vary 
between 10-25%, except Russia with 38% and Ukraine with 48%.  
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Figure II.2 Central Bank Capture for South Eastern European states 
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There are similarities in the perception of the business environment upon the Legislative 
and/or Presidential Capture and the Central Bank Capture, the levels indicated in the two 
figures emphasising similar evolutions.   
 
Figure II.3.a Legal Capture – sale of court decisions in criminal cases 
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Figure II.3.b Legal Capture - sale of court decisions in commercial cases 
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As resulted from Figure II.1. The legal capture refers to the sale of court decisions in 
criminal and arbitration court cases. The assessments are between 5-18%, except for 
Croatia (35%), Moldova (38%), Russia (29%) and Ukraine (27%).  
 
Figure II.4 Non transparent political party finance 
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The evaluations presented in Figure II.4 refer to the contributions by private interests to 
political parties and election campaigns and it is, on average, between 5-42%, with 
Bulgaria and Moldova at the highest level (42%). On the basis of the elements presented 
before we computed a composite index of state capture that also varies between 8-38% 
(see Table II.2). 
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With reference to the forms of corruption emphasised in Table II.1, relevant for the 
administrative corruption, the perception of the business environment upon what the 
author calls “patronage” is presented in Figure II.5. 
 
Figure II.5 The perception of the business environment upon the patronage in the South 
Eastern European states 
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Here also it can be observed that there are major discrepancies varying between 12% 
(Belarus, Slovenia) and 43% (Bulgaria). 
The petty corruption, meaning bribes to public officials to avoid taxes and regulations is 
the most prevailing form of administrative corruption. Their perception varies from 9% 
(Slovenia) to 40% (Romania). The two forms of administrative corruption have, on 
average, similar evolutions for each state. 
 
Going back to the composite index of state capture, in Table II.2 there are presented in 
synthesis both the indices for each type of capture, correlated with the administrative 
corruption, and the classification according to the intensity of the relation between state 
capture and administrative corruption17 (acc. to Figure I.2). 
                                                 
17 Adapted after Hellman, Jones and Kaufmann (2000), op.cit., pp.10. 
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Table II.2 State Capture and Administrative Corruption, by South Eastern European 
Countries 
Country State Capture Index Administrative 
corruption 
No. Parliament
ary 
legislation 
(% of 
firms) 
Presidentia
l  
decrees 
(% of 
firms) 
Central 
Bank 
(% of 
firms) 
Criminal  
Courts 
(% of 
firms)  
Commerc
ial  
Courts 
(% of 
firms) 
Party 
finance 
(%of 
firms) 
Captur
e 
econo
my 
index 
(% of 
firms) 
Capture 
economy 
classificat
ion  
(% of firms) 
Level 
of 
bribery  
of 
firms 
Classificat
ion of 
administr
ative 
corruptio
n 
Albania 12 7 8 22 20 25 16 Medium 4.0 High 
Bulgaria 28 26 28 28 19 42 28 High 2.1 Medium 
Croatia 18 24 30 29 29 30 27 High 1.1 Medium 
Moldova 43 30 40 33 34 42 37 High 4.0 High 
Romania 22 20 26 14 17 27 21 High 3.2 High 
Russia 35 32 47 24 27 24 32 High 2.8 Medium 
Slovenia 8 5 4 6 6 11 7 Medium 1.4 Medium 
Ukraine 44 37 37 21 26 29 32 High 4.4 High 
   
 
 
II.4 The anticorruption strategy in Romania 
 
The analysis of the anticorruption strategies in Romania, aiming both at the state capture 
and the administrative corruption is based on key elements, challenges and priorities 
previously defined in Figure I.2. 
Romania’s preoccupations to become a European, democratic state, with an efficient 
administration are reflected especially in the last decade in “the impressive arsenal of 
legal instruments for transparency, responsibility and anticorruption18, aiming to develop 
standards and best practices at the level of administration and other key sectors, such as 
the sanitary system, bodies to maintain public order, justice and strengthening  internal 
and international cooperation in the field of preventing and fight against corruption, 
representing the three priority areas of the National Anticorruption Strategy 2005-2007 
(Table II.3). 
 
                                                 
18 Freedom House Washington Inc. (2005), Independent audit of National Anticorruption Strategy 2001-
2004. 
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Table II.3.   Priority areas and objectives of the National Anticorruption Strategy 2005- 
200719 (combating state capture/administrative corruption) 
Impact 
Priority area Objectives State 
Capture 
Administrative 
Corruption 
Objective 1 Increasing the transparency 
and  integrity in public administration X  
Objective 2 Preventing corruption in the 
business environment  X 
Priority area I 
 
PREVENTION, 
TRANSPARENCY, 
EDUCATION Objective 3  Information campaigns and 
educational measures X  
Objective 4 Increasing the integrity and 
resistance to corruption of the judiciary 
system 
X  
Objective 5 Reducing the number of 
structures that have tasks in the fight 
against corruption  
X  
Objective 6 Strengthening the 
institutional capacity of the National 
Anticorruption Prosecutors Office 
(NAPO) 
 X 
Objective 7 Increasing the celerity of 
criminal prosecution and criminal trials  X 
Priority area II 
 
COMBATING 
CORRUPTION 
 
 
Objective 8 Combating corruption 
through administrative means   X 
Objective 9 Coordinating and monitoring 
the  implementation of Strategy and 
Action Plan 
X X 
Priority area III 
 
INTERNAL 
COOPERATION 
AND  
COORDINATION 
Objective 10 Fully implementing all the 
anticorruption instruments of UE, UN, 
CoE and OECD 
X X 
 
      The mission of the Strategy 2005-2007 is to prevent and counter the phenomenon of 
state capture by refining and rigorously implementing the legal framework, through 
legislative coherence and stability, and by institutional strengthening of the entities with 
important tasks in the field. 
    Administrative corruption will be the main object of a new document National 
Strategy on preventing and combating corruption in vulnerable sectors and local 
government (2008-2010). This strategy aims to design and implement new measures for 
combating or reducing corruption in vulnerable sectors and local government, based on 
the internal and external assessments of the previous strategy during the period of its 
application, as well as to continue the efforts in fighting against corruption. In order to 
sustain the areas and objectives of the new strategy (Table II.4) four benchmarks – BM - 
were identified by the European Commission and they were comprised in the 
                                                 
19 Decision of the Government of Romania no. 231 on 30 March 2005 concerning the approval of the 
National Anticorruption Strategy 2005-2007 and the Action Plan for implementing the National 
Anticorruption Strategy 2005-2007, Official Journal no. 272 on 1 April 2005. 
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Commission Decision no. 2006/928/EC on 13 December 200620; we remark the 
conditional element number 4, referring to „Adoption of additional measures for 
preventing and fighting against corruption, especially in local government”.  
The representatives of central government, the representatives of association 
structures of local governments have been the actors who elaborated the strategy. 
In view of implementing the strategy, the measures adopted at administration level aimed 
mainly legislative harmonisation and coordination of the legal framework in the field-
most measures in the Action Plan were legislative ones. For example, in the sanitary 
system, the most important normative acts regulating the specific medical activities are 
as follows:  
Law no. 95/2006 on the reform in the field of health (collection of laws for reform in 
health);  
Government Decision no. 862 / 2006, on organisation of the Ministry of Public Health;  
Government Decision no 1842/2006 (for approving the Framework Contract on the 
conditions for medical assistance inside the social security system for health for 2007);  
Order No. 840/2003, on the Methodological Rules for internal public audit in the 
Ministry of Health;  
 
Table II.4.  Priority areas and objectives of the National Strategy on preventing and combating 
corruption in vulnerable sectors and local government (2008-2010) (administrative 
corruption/state capture) 
Impact 
Priority area Objectives SC AC 
 
Priority area I 
 
ANALYSES, STUDIES, 
RESEARCHES ON THE 
CORRUPTION PHENOMENON 
Objective: Supporting public 
administration in view to 
evaluate the size of the 
corruption phenomenon  X X 
Objective 1: Increasing the 
information degree and 
awareness on the risks 
associated to corruption   
 X 
Objective 2: Increasing the 
transparency in the  public 
services  
X  
Objective 3: Developing the 
human resource management 
system in view to diminish the 
risks associated to the 
corruption phenomenon   
 X 
 
Priority area II 
 
COOPERATION, 
TRANSPARENCY, INTEGRITY, 
SIMPLIFICATION OF THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE 
PROCEDURES 
 
Objective 4: Simplifying the 
administrative procedures in 
view to improve the public 
services  
X  
                                                 
20 Commission Decision no. 2006/928/EC on 13 December 2006, published in Official Journal of the 
European Union no. 354 on 14 December 2006.  
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• Order no. 1136/2005, on the Programme for development of the management control 
system of the Ministry of Public Health and creation of the working group for 
monitoring, coordinating and methodological guidance concerning the management 
control systems in the Ministry of Public Health, transposing the Order no. 946/2005 
(Code on the internal control) of the Ministry of Public Finance (MFP);  
• Order of the National Chamber of Health Insurance no. 328/2006, on monitoring and 
control in the health social insurance systems;  
• Order of the Minister of Public Health no. 880/2006, on the Regulation for 
organisation and functioning of the Public Health Authority (inquiries and 
complaints);  
• Order of the Minister of Public Health no. 922 on 27 July 2006, on approving the 
model for the management contract of the public hospital;  
• Order of the Minister of Public Health no. 921 / 2006, on the attributions of the 
steering committee of the hospitals;  
• Order no. 1781/558 on 27 December 2006 (for approving the Methodological rules to 
apply Framework Contract concerning the conditions for providing medical 
assistance in the health social insurance systems  for 2007);  
• Order of the Minister of Public Health no. 320/2007 on the Contract of administrating 
the department/laboratory or medical service in the public hospital. 
  
The Governing Programme of Romania 2009-201221 in Chapter 22: Reform of public 
administration and Chapter 23: Justice and anticorruption policies, states the fight against 
corruption, simplification of administrative procedures, increasing the transparency of 
public services as governance objectives. 
                                                 
21 Source: http://www.gov.ro  
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Chapter III  
Empirical studies concerning state capture and/or administrative corruption in the 
public health service from Romania 
 
The national authorities and the international organisations are concerned to evaluate 
corruption in the public health service. Without insisting on the extension and results of 
the above studies, we remark some important assertions in this field. 
Thus, Transparency International (2006)22 reviews the main causes of corruption in the 
health care services. The conclusions reveal both “the propensity to corruption in public 
health services”23, providing examples about the specific modalities for this field 
concerning the principal agent theory and state capture. 
 
III. 1 State capture mechanisms in the public health service  
Emphasising five main actors in the health services, the core causes of corruption are: 
uncertainty, asymmetry of information and high number of actors.24
  
 
       Government 
         regulator 
Payer 
(Social security, 
private 
or public health 
insurance)
Other 
Supplier 
(e.g. 
construction) 
Drug & 
equipment 
Supplier 
Provider 
(Public or 
private 
hospitals, 
physicians)
                Patients
State capture 
Definition and 
approval of norms 
Extortion 
by 
inspectors 
Drug approval &control 
Equipment norms 
State capture
Influence on  
decision-makers 
Negative 
incentives 
to save 
costs 
Over-
provision 
Absenteeism 
Overbilling 
Phantom 
Bribes to 
overlook 
compliance 
Influence on  
decision-makers 
Prescription 
practices 
Drug & equipment 
procurement 
Procurement 
(facilities, 
ambulances) 
Informal payments 
Unnecessary treatment & prescriptions 
Fraud in beneficiary ID use 
Understatement of income 
Figure III. 1 State capture mechanisms in the public health service25
                                                 
22 Transparency International (2006), “The Causes of Corruption in the Health Sector: a focus on health 
care systems”, www.transparency.org/.../20corruption.pdf 
23 Savedoff, D., W, Hussmann, K., (2005), “Why are health systems prone to corruption”, included in 
Transparency International (2006), p.6 
24  Transparency International (2006), op.cit., p.5 
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The modalities of corruption aim mainly issues of regulation, social security 
organisations, health insurance organisations, providers of health care, patients, 
equipment suppliers. The study emphasises, concretely, for each actor, the possibilities of 
fraud or corruption. 
Corruption in health services has an endemic character, being expressed in relation to the 
national and universal specificity, as many causes and modalities are similar in several 
states. 
It is worth to mention other papers, relevant for the topic approached by us, namely, 
Arrow (1963), Lewis (2006), Andrei, Matei, Stancu and Andrei (2009). At the same time, 
Andrei, Matei and Oancea (2009) achieve a statistical processing and analysis on the 
relations between corruption and performance in the health public service in Romania. 
 
III.2 Public Health Care Markets 
 
Unlike other goods and services, the health care services embody some unique 
characteristics stemming from inherent market failures. First is the asymmetry of 
information and agencies in charge of physicians, acting as agents for patients. The 
patients are aware they do not feel well but they rely on health professionals, often 
physicians, to act as their agents in diagnosing and treating illnesses.  
Patients are ill-equipped to assess the adequacy and quality of physician decisions 
and actions, and therefore focus on the environmental and interpersonal aspects of 
clinical services, the elements they are best able to evaluate.  
Second, the adverse selection practices by private health insurers lead to an 
uninsured population disproportionately made up of those most in need of health care: the 
chronically ill, the poor and those having experienced a catastrophic illness.  
Government’s intervention compensates for the market’s reluctance to insure the 
most vulnerable. And, because of the random nature of illness or injury, government 
subsidies protect the population against the financial expenditures linked with the illness.  
Finally, the moral hazard of over-consumption by the insured who do not face the 
true cost of health care requires an adequate mechanism of cost control, the key issue for 
OECD countries and relevant for the development countries as well.  
A second form of moral hazard is the over production of care by physicians when 
third parties cover the costs. Physician induced costs act in the same manner the 
consumer does, with similar implications for payers.  
In most countries market failures translate into publicly financed and delivered 
care. Most developing countries depend heavily on a public intervention rather than 
regulation, hence the predominance of public health care services in those countries.  
A limitation in assessing existing health care services is the lack of any single 
measure of what constitutes a functioning system. Every OECD country has its own, 
unique health care arrangements with a mix of public and private financing, delivery and 
regulations. OECD comparisons of system performance tend to be limited to gross 
measures such as spending for the levels of mortality or statistics.  
The more meaningful comparisons are those based on specific diseases where 
costs, treatment options and outcomes can be compared, though countries do not 
                                                                                                                                                 
25 Undertaken after Savedoff and Husmann (2005), p. 7 
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necessarily collect comparable data limiting the extent of meaningful comparisons. For 
the developing countries, systems differ and information on comparable indicators simply 
does not yet exist.  
This effort proves the “government’s failure” to live up to the objectives of public 
policy, looking specifically at efficiency enhancement and redistribution, and focusing on 
incentives as a means to improve performance without compromising equity objectives 
(Jack and Lewis, 2004).  
  
III.3 Social perception of corruption in the public health service in Romania 
 
In the analyses of corruption and social perception assessment the exact borders between 
the phenomena of state capture and administrative corruption are hard to define. Often 
identified with the grand corruption, state capture aims at the political processes and their 
major influences upon the normative mechanisms, of functioning and implementations of 
a certain social subsystem. The administrative corruption refers to the petty corruption 
that materialises in direct payments and several advantages provided/obtained as a result 
of delivering some preferential or illicit services.  
 For the public health service in Romania a social research was made in order to 
extract the social perception of the basic characteristics of their reform. In this regard, we 
as well will tackle a series of specificities of the phenomena of state capture and 
administrative corruption in the public health service in Romania. The analyses that will 
be presented use the results from Andrei, Matei, Stancu and Andrei (2009b), as well as 
from Andrei, Matei and Oancea (2009a)     
Reform of public health is a complex and lengthy process, which involves 
different types of institutions and individuals. During the transition, actions undertaken 
by all governments have pursued solving the current problems and not to define a new 
functioning philosophy of the public health service. Under these circumstances, public 
health service has become expensive and often non-functional. Not a few times, 
inefficient solutions have been chosen for solving problems in the health service, both in 
terms of professional, but also economically. The networks of health services providers 
from 
Romania, currently do not respond to most needs to improve the health of the population. 
In the past eighteen years, a series of measures have been undertaken to 
decentralize the system and to the privatization of medical services. However, currently 
we assist to a fragmentation of the system, which emphasize the inequality in the 
distribution of medical personnel and a reduction of it to certain types of medical 
services. We note that the number of doctors per capita in the rural area is now only 20% 
of those in urban areas. Another major shortcoming is related to the financing and linking 
it with the strategies of decentralization. Not a few times, decentralization appeared as a 
way of placement of the tasks from the central level to local administrations. 
Hypothesis 1. The reform process in the public health service will determine, in 
an average time horizon, changes in national policy of public health service viewed from 
the perspective of increasing the volume of public expenditure for health, the policy of 
national programs carried out by the health ministry and the increase of the transparency 
in the usage of public funds for compensate and free drugs in the primary medicine. 
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Hypothesis 2. The results of the reform process are perceived by reducing the 
level of the corruption in the public health service, by narrowing the manifest area of the 
state capture phenomenon and diminishing the administrative corruption.  
Hypothesis 3. State capture is the result of a process dependent on the quality of 
the reform, transparent decision making, the accessibility level of the citizens to health, 
the influences and involvement of the political factors in the system’s management, the 
medical personnel satisfaction etc.  
Hypothesis 4. Administrative corruption is a direct consequence of the mentality 
of the medical personnel, the low accessibility level of the population to health, lack of 
professional and material satisfaction of the medical personnel as well as the influence of 
other social subsystems, especially the political, economic or the business environment.     
Data sample 
For data collection we used a two stage poll. The first stage was represented by 
public health units from Bucharest (hospitals, health centres, polyclinics) which were 
treated as primary sampling units. The second stage was represented by doctors in each 
primary sampling unit.  
The representative sample from Bucharest consisted in 407 people, and the survey 
results are guaranteed with a 95% probability in circumstances where there is an error of 
representativeness of ± 2.5%.  
The sample was divided in three categories of staff, as family doctors - 75, 
doctors in hospitals - 279 and doctors in polyclinics - 53.  
The period of recording the information in the sample was about two weeks, these 
weeks being in June 2007. Thus the comparability of such responses from the individuals 
included in the sample was ensured, meaning that during this period there were not taken 
any major decisions at the Ministry of Health to change the opinion of respondents, while 
most people were present at the workplace.  
 
III.3.1 Assessing the state capture level 
During the research we designed a questionnaire which was structured according 
to eight themes presentation in Table III.3. For each theme of the analysis the number of 
primary variables is specified in the table below. Based on the 52 questions in the 
questionnaire, of which 49 have been closed, were set 153 primary variables. Using 
primary characteristics a series of aggregated characteristics have been defined to be used 
in the simultaneous equations model. 
 
Table III.3 Primary and aggregated variables grouped on themes 
No. The theme The number 
of primary 
variables 
The 
number of 
aggregated 
variables 
1.  General issues concerning the reform of the public health service 41 14 
2.  Ministry policy in this area 18 5 
3.  Health education of the population 18 4 
4.  The analysis of corruption 24 7 
5.  Characteristics of current activities 6 2 
6.  Personal aspects 32 1 
7.  General data 14 - 
8.  Total 153 33 
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In table III.4 are presented the variables used in the model.  
 
Table III.4 Synthetic description of the aggregated variables used for the 
simultaneous equations model 
No. Code Aggregated variable description Primary 
variable 
number 
1.  RSS 
 
The variable is defined to measure the medical staff 
opinion on the quality of reform in the public health 
viewed from the perspective of six components: system 
funding, procurement of medicines, the process of 
decentralization, the employment and promotion of staff 
with medium and higher medical studies and reform 
measures applied to the units in which they are 
employed. Range of values: 1 - very poor, 2, 3, 4, 5-very 
good. 
6 
2.  CSE Estimates the quality of the assessment system of health 
services provided to beneficiaries. 
Range of values: 1 - unsatisfactory, 2, 3, 4 - very good. 
3 
3.  TMS It is an aggregate variable used to estimate the ministry 
transparency in decision-making in the reform process.  
Range of values: 1 - unsatisfactory, 2, 3, 4 - very good. 
2 
4.  SC Aggregated variable used to measure the level of 
corruption at the national level in the opinion of medical 
staff with higher education.  
Range of values: 1 - there is no corruption, 2, 3, 4, 5 - 
there is generalized corruption. 
5 
5.  SCP Primary variable used to assess to what extent the 
political change of management personnel on political 
criteria.  
Range of values: 1 – changes in the leadership have not 
been made based on political changes, 2, 3, 4 - changing 
the technical staff on political criteria of is a practice. 
1 
6.  GSM Aggregated variable defined to assess the satisfaction 
degree of the medical personnel. Range of values: 1 - are 
not happy at all, 2, 3, 4, 5 - fully satisfied. 
5 
 
In order to assess the physicians’ perception regarding the level of corruption 
from certain systems o measuring scale with five values was used, defined as it follows: 
• Value 1 is assigned whether in the person’s opinion there is no corruption in 
the area of interest; 
• Value 2 if there is corruption but insignificant; 
• Value 3 if there is moderate corruption; 
• Value 4 if there is corruption to a large extent; 
• Value 5 if there is a generalised corruption in the targeted field. 
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The aspects of the state capture phenomenon from the public health service have an 
important contribution in the implementation of the reform process in the system and in 
the quality improvement of the medical act. 
The relations (3) and (4) estimate the contribution of some factors in reducing the state 
capture (SC), such as the features of the reform process (RSS); the system for evaluating 
the quality of services (CSE); the transparency of the decisions, the accessibility of 
citizens to health care (TMS); changing based on the political criteria of the management 
personnel (SCP); the satisfaction level of the medical personnel (GSM); personal 
characteristics of the interviewed person (VP).  
 
ε+= ),,,,,( VPGSMSCPTMSCSERSSfSC       (3) 
 
The variable ε is uncorrelated with explanatory variables in the regression model, being 
homoscedastic. The f function is defined as a linear combination of explanatory variables. 
In these circumstances, the regression model is defined as: 
 
iiiii VPdGSMdSCPdTMSdCSEdRSSddSC ε+++++++= 6543210   (4) 
 
d6 is a line vector with three parameters and VP is a column vector for the three variables 
used to evaluate certain personal characteristics.  
Estimating the model’s parameters (4) was accomplished through procedures 
implemented in EViews, applying the Hansman test, the results obtained for the given 
model can be compared for the cases where the parameters are estimated through the 
ordinary least squares method (OLS) and through the two-stage least squares method 
(TSLS).  
Table III.5 shows the results from the application of the least squares method for the 
estimates of the parameters of the model used to analyze the SC variable which is defined 
by (4). 
 
Table III.5 Regression model (4) characteristics 
 
Dependant variable: SC 
Source model 
characteristics 
Regressors 
Residuum 
Total 
Squares sum 
43917.20 
386.96 
4778.16 
Degrees of freedom 
8 
399 
407 
Observations number       407 
F                                    566.0 
Prob>F                          0.000 
Explanatory variables Coefficient Standard deviation T-student statistics and the 
level of 
significance 
RSS  -0.028  0.079    -0.354 (0.725) 
CSS 0.029 0.071 0.415 (0.679) 
TMS 0.125 0.064 1.939 (0.053) 
SCP 0.186 0.061 3.043 (0.002) 
GSM 0,758 0.091 8.357 (0.000) 
GEN 0.061 0.043 1.418 (0.157) 
ANI 0.155 0.049 3.195 (0.002) 
PER 0.320 0.040 8.021 (0.000) 
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The results from Table III.5 show three categories of explanatory variables included in 
the model: 
(1) First are the variables TMS, SCP, GSM, ANI and PER whose parameters 
significantly differ from zero in the regression model defined above. 
(2) The second category includes the variable GEN which is likely to be included in the 
model. 
(3) The third category includes variables RSS and CSE whose parameters do not 
significantly differ from zero in the current regression model. 
The results from the application of OLS to the situation in which the SC is explained in terms of 
explanatory variables TMS, SCP, GSM, GEN, ANI, PER are presented in table III.6. 
 
Table III.6 Regression model SC depending on TMS, SCP, GSM, GEN, ANI, PER 
Dependant variable: SC 
Source model 
characteristics 
Regressors 
Residuum 
Total 
Squares sum 
4390.9 
387.2 
4778.1 
Degrees of freedom 
6 
401 
407 
Observations number       407 
F                                    747.9 
Prob>F                          0.000 
Explanatory variables Coefficient Standard deviation T-student statistics and the 
level of 
significance 
TMS 0.123 0.060 2.040 (0.042) 
SCP 0.320 0.040 8.043 (0.000) 
GSM 0.187 0.053 3.556 (0.000) 
GEN 0.761 0.088 8.615 (0.014) 
ANI 0.060 0.042 1.413 (0.150) 
PER 0.154 0.048 3.188 (0.002) 
 
As a result, relation (4) becomes: 
 
ε++++++= PERANIGENGSMSCPTMSSC 154.0060.0761.0187.0320.0123.0    (5) 
 
Where ε represents the error and it must be determined by comparing the real data (ε = -
2.975). Equation (5) does not provide an assessment, on a scale from 1 to 5 of the social 
perception of the state capture phenomenon in the public health service. As an example, 
if we were to consider that all the variables in (5) would take the 2.5 value, then SC = 
1.0125 thus, judging in terms of defining the state capture index, is equivalent with the 
favourable perception of the state capture phenomenon by 20.25% of the private actors in 
the public health service.  
 
III.3.2 Assessing the administrative corruption (AC) in the public health service 
 
The assessment of the administrative corruption level in the public health service follows 
chapter VI from Andrei et al. (2009b). The general diagram of the applied questionnaire 
can be found in the appendix. For each question, the used scale was from 1 to 5. Based on 
the answers and their processing, the results are the following.  
a) The perception of corruption in the public health service and other fields 
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The results are presented in III.7. 
 
Tab. III.7. Level of corruption on certain areas 
Education Health Political areas Public 
administration 
The 
institution in 
which the 
doctor work 
3.16 
(0.975) 
3.28 
(0.992) 
4.29 
(0.840) 
4.02 
(0.866) 
2.47 
(1.081) 
Note: under each average there is in bracket mean square deviation 
 
In order to assure the compatibilities of data obtained through analysis with the one used 
for measuring corruption through Corruption Perception Index calculated by 
Transparency International, using the transformation of data as below: 
 
Index of Corruption (TI) = 2(5-Index of corruption) 
 
In the case of TI index a low value highlights a high level of corruption from a specific 
area. The domain of values of the index is from 1 to 10. In the interpretation of results we 
have to take into account that in 2007 corruption in Romania estimated on Transparency 
International methodology’s is 3.7, Romanian being on the spot 30 at the level of entire 
Europe. Confidence interval estimated for this is 3.4, 4.1. In world rating Romania’s 
place is 60.  
As a result of transformation from above we obtain the following results in certain areas 
of activity: 
   
Education Health Political 
areas 
Public 
administration 
The institution in 
which the doctor 
works 
3.78 3.44 1.42 1.96 5.06 
 
The index of corruption, calculated on the base of data at the level of sample, on the base 
of results from the five institutions, presents the following characters: 
? The value of corruption index is 3,23 and standard deviation 0,759. In order to 
calculate la medium level has been used questionnaires, 375 pieces, with variables 
answers at all five questions which has been the base for defining primary 
variable. 
? The index of corruption evaluated on the basis of transformation is equal with 
3.52, value which stand in confidence interval of Corruption Perception Index of 
Transparency International. 
? Distribution of corruption definite on the series of data is a symmetrical one. 
? There are significantly differences between distributions of variable AC definite 
on areas of activity. Relative similar profiles are recorded in the case of series of 
data from education and health, respectively administration and political areas. 
Otherwise, for education and health, respectively public administration and 
political areas the recorded values almost equal. 
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Figure III.1. Distribution of answers concerning level of corruption on areas of activity 
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b) Factors of reducing/encouraging of corruption 
 
Table III.9 Distribution of answers concerning contribution of some factors to encourage 
corruption (%) 
  
Non 
answer 
Largely Pretty much Moderate 
In an 
insignificant 
measure 
Not at 
all 
 
Over
all 
1.Legal 
framework 
5,7 22,9 18,2 25,3 20,4 7,5 100,0 
2. The wage 
system 
2,9 64,9 21,6 6,6 2,2 1,7 100,0 
3. Pressure 
from economic 
environment 
5,4 
33,7 29,2 19,9 9,3 2,5 
100,0 
4. Pressure 
from political 
system 
6,4 
24,6 22,1 20,6 19,4 6,9 
100,0 
5. Patient 
behaviour 
4,9 16,7 19,4 26,8 20,9 11,3 100,0 
   Also, in tab III.10 there is a distribution of the answers regarding the contribution of 
other institutions in reducing corruption. 
 
  Table III.10 Distribution of answers concerning contribution of some institutions in reducing 
corruption (%) 
  
Non 
answer 
Negative Moderately negative 
No 
influence 
Moderately 
positive Positive 
 
Overall 
1. Mass - 
media 
3,2 12,3 9,8 17,9 44,5 12,3 100,0 
2. School 3,4 5,4 5,7 38,3 35,4 11,8 100,0 
3. Church 3,9 4,2 3,7 50,1 26,3 11,8 100,0 
4. Political 
class 
3,2 42,8 25,6 10,6 9,8 8,1 100,0 
5. 
Representative 
of the state/ 
civil servant 
3,2 
34,6 29,0 12,8 11,8 8,6 
100,0 
 
We can see that three institutions - school, mass media and the church – have an 
important contribution at reducing AC in the society. Also, the behaviour of the political 
class and of the public servants has a moderately negative influence upon the reduction of 
AC in the system. 
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Figure III.2  Distribution of  answers concerning contribution of some factors to encourage corruption 
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   Figure III.3 Contribution of some factors to reduce corruption 
d) Perception concerning the evolution of AC 
The questionnaires have made the distinction between general perception of AC in last 
years, ACU, and perception of AC after Romanian integration in EU, ACPA. For these 
two variables used, ACU and ACPA have been taking into account 338 questionnaires 
which had valid answers. The conclusions can be summarizing as it follows: 
? Medium level of the two variables is 2.72 (standard deviation 0,887) for 
ACU and 3.26(standard deviation 0,843) for ACPA. In these 
circumstances we can consider that administrative corruption has known a 
slight increase in last period and for the next period will have a slight 
decrease. 
? The linear coefficient of correlation calculated for data series 
corresponding for two variables is equal with 0.638 and is significantly 
different of 0.638 for a for a threshold of significance of 0.01  
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Fig. III.4 Evolution of corruption before and after integration 
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III.4 A regression analysis 
The data calculated along with the analysis allowed us to accomplish some statistic 
analyses concerning independent variables. So, if we note with TAC – transformation 
from the health service due to political change, FAC – variable concerning factors that 
favour administrative corruption, and RAC - variable concerning factors of reducing 
administrative corruption, then Pearson correlations are presented in tab III.11 
 AC FAC RAC TAC 
AC       Pearson Correlation  
             Sig (2-tailed) 
1 - 0,206
2760, 
0,247 
0,189 
- 0, 264 
0,158 
FAC      Pearson Correlation  
              Sig (2-tailed) 
 1 - 0,015 
0,938 
0, 658 
0,000 
RAC      Pearson Correlation  
              Sig (2-tailed) 
  1 0,058 
0,760 
TAC     Pearson Correlation  
             Sig (2-tailed) 
   1 
 It is easy to extract conclusions from tab. III. 11. Summarize it will be like this: 
? A slight correlation between all four variables that proves the low level 
of maturation of anticorruption process in public health service. 
? Inverse correlation between administrative corruption (AC) and 
transformation in public health service due to political changes ( - 
0,264) and also with factors which favours administrative corruption ( 
- 0,206); 
? Absence of a practical correlation between the variables that refer to 
encouraging administrative corruption respectively reducing 
administrative corruption.       
By using regression analysis we can obtain the following relation: 
AC = 16.484 – 0,036FAC + 0,270 RAC – 0,223 TAC                     (6) 
As coefficient of FAC in not significantly different to zero, the variable do not influence 
significantly relation (6). As result by renouncing to these we will obtain a close relation: 
 
  AC = 16,158 + 0,271 RAC – 0,241 TAC              (7) 
 
The two relations regarding state capture (SC) and administrative corruption (AC) 
describe, for a variation of the variables introduced, the evolution of the two phenomena 
based on empirical analysis.    
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Conclusions 
 
The two phenomenon state capture and administrative corruption are presented 
and have an evolution also in the public health services in Romania. Although their 
evolutions are different, in the social analysis the perception of some important parts can 
be confused. As a result when we tackle the perception of corruption it does not mean 
that we simply add the two phenomena. Under a continuous reduction of corruption in 
Romania, the relation between the evolutions of the two phenomena, state capture and 
administrative corruption is not linear. The causes of the two phenomena are different. In 
the anticorruption strategies both the causes and the existent evaluation on medium and 
log term must be followed. The analysis presented in this paper aims at substantiating the 
decisions regarding the fight against corruption. 
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Appendix 
 
a) How do you appreciate the level of corruption in the following areas of activity (mark 
only one answer on the line) 
 There is no 
corruption 
It exist 
corruption in 
an 
insignificant 
extent 
It exist 
corruption 
at a 
moderate 
level 
It exist 
corruption 
in a largely 
extent 
It exist 
generalized 
corruption 
1. Education      
2. Health      
3. Political 
environment 
     
4. Public 
administration 
     
5. In your 
institution 
     
 
 
b1) In your opinion which are the elements that favours the corruption in public health 
system: (mark only one answer on the line) 
  
Non answer Largely Pretty much Moderate 
In an 
insignificant 
measure 
Not at all 
1.Legal framework       
2. The wage system       
3. Pressure from 
economic environment 
      
4. Pressure from political 
system 
      
5. Patient behaviour       
 
 
b2) How do you consider that the next elements contribute to the reduction of corruption: 
(mark only one answer on the line) 
  
Non 
answer 
Negative Moderately negative 
No 
influence 
Moderately 
positive Positive 
1. Mass - media       
2. School       
3. Church       
4. Political class       
5. Representative of 
the state/ civil servant 
      
6. Citizen behaviour       
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c) How do you appreciate the evolution of the level of corruption in public health system: 
 (mark only one answer on the line) 
The level of 
corruption has 
grow a lot 
The level of 
corruption has 
grow 
The level of 
corruption did 
not suffer any 
significant 
evolution 
The level of 
corruption 
decrease 
moderate 
The level of 
corruption 
decrease 
significantly 
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